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FEDmRAL PRocrum-VrNuE m TInn-PARTY ToRT ACTIONS AGAINST THE
UaTED STATis-Plaintiff sustained serious injuries when he was struck by a
mail pouch thrown from defendanes moving train by a United States mail
clerk. Action was was brought against the railroad in the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma, whereupon the railroad filed a third-party com-
plaint against the United States, alleging negligence on the part of the mail
clerk. The United States moved for a dismissal on the ground that both plain-
tiffs residence and the situs of the injury were in the Eastern District of Okla-
homa; since the venue provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. (1952) §1402(b)' pre-
scribe that tort actions against the United States may be brought only in the
district where the plaintiff resides or where the act or omission complained of
occurred, the United States had not consented to be sued in the Western Dis-
trict. The motion was denied, and judgments were rendered against both the
railroad and the United States. On appeal, held, affirmed. A third-party action
being ancillary in nature, its venue might be derived from that of the original
action. United States v. Acord, (10th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 709.
The reasoning by which the court arrived at its conclusion is open to ques-
tion. Having initially conceded that the United States may prescribe the terms
under which it consents to be sued,2 the court shifted to a consideration of
matters having nothing to do with the relinquishment of immunity to suit.
Attention was given to rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3
which provides for the institution of a third-party complaint when a third-party
defendant is or may be liable over to the defendant in the original action. The
court found that (1) independent grounds for federal jurisdiction need not
be shown in the third-party action,4 (2) rule 14(a) entitles an original defendant
to bring a third-party action against the United States when the venue require-
ments of section 1402(b) are met,5 (3) rule 14(a) has been construed to allow
the ancillary action to derive its venue from the original action," and therefore
(4) the venue requirements of section 1402(b) need not be met-in an ancillary
1 Section 1402(b): "Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States under
subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred."2 Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 59 S.Ct. 292 (1939); United States v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 60 S.Ct. 659 (1940); United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, (10th Cir.
1951) 191 F. (2d) 518; Miller v. United States, (D.C. Wash. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 523.
3 28 U.S.C. (1952) following §2072. See g~nerally 3 Mooan, FEDERAL PRAMCTCE,
2d ed., §§14.25, 14.28(2), 14.29 (1948).4 Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 815; Waylander-
Peterson Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (8th Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 408. See also 1
BARRON AD HoL-rzopv, FEDERAL PmcrncE AND PROcEDuRE §424 (1950). Where the
United States has preserved its immunity, however, there can be no suit against it even in
an ancillary action. United States v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F.
(2d) 917.
5 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct. 399 (1951).
6 Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 4 supra; Morrell v. United Air Lines Trans-
port Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 757; Dickey v. Turner, (6th Cir. 1931) 49 F.
(2d) 998. Contra: Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1939) 29 F.
Supp. 112; King v. Shepherd, (D.C. Ark. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 357.
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action when there is no inconvenience to the government. 7 No further consid-
eration was given to the contention of the government that section 1402(b)
defines the precise terms under which the United States has given its consent
to be sued for torts. Thus, by resorting to the authority of cases dealing with
venue requirements other than those of section 1402(b), the court begged the
question whether section 1402(b) constitutes not only a venue requirement8
but also a limitation on governmental consent to be sued. Faulty reasoning,
however, often leads to surprisingly accurate results. Section 1406(b) of Title
28 makes it clear that a district court will not be deprived of jurisdiction by
virtue of the requirements of section 1402(b) unless a timely and sufficient
objection is made to the venue.9 By coupling this provision with the well recog-
nized rule that an agent of the government'0 cannot waive governmental
immunity where the sovereign itself has not consented to be sued," it can be
argued quite forcibly that Congress did not intend section 1402(b) to constitute
an absolute limitation on governmental amenability to tort claims.'2 The only
alternative to this conclusion is that section 1402(b) is a limitation on consent
which can be waived by a district attorney-a highly improbable result.' s Had
7 The granting of a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint is discretionary
with the trial court, and where great inconvenience will result to the original plaintiff or
the third-party defendant, the motion will be denied. See Missouri ex rel. and to the Use
of Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, (8th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 327; Baltimore
& 0. R. Co. v. Saunders, (4th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 481.8 In the statutory predecessor to §1402(b), the language employed by Congress indi-
cated a jurisdictional limitation rather than merely a venue requirement. As originally
enacted, the Federal Tort Claims Act contained the following: "Subject to the provisions
of this title, the United States District court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident
or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred . . . shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion . . ." over tort claims permitted by the act. 60 Stat. L. 843 (1946). Italics added.
This language was preserved intact in the 1947 amendment, 61 Stat. L. 722 (1947).
When the judicial code was enacted in 1948, the jurisdiction and venue provisions were
separated for the first time. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1346(b), 1402(b). Congressional hear-
ings and reports concerning the judicial code fail, however, to indicate that Congress was
aware of the change effected. See H. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947); S. Rep.
No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948); H. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). Even though
Congress might have been entirely unaware of the change, there need be no resort to the
preceding acts if the language of the judicial code is clear, for the code is not merely a
codification of previously existing law; it is a positive enactment of law. See 62 Stat. L.
869 (1948); Mooan, ColmrENTAY oN THE U.S. JuDicrAL CoDE 75, 83 (1949).
9 Section 1406(b): "Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district
court of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection
to the venue."
1o In this case a government attorney.
11 United States v. Shaw, note 2 supra; Minnesota v. United States, note 2 supra. On
the other hand, it is well settled that the United States may waive venue requirements just
as any other party. Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297, 69 S.Ct. 70 (1948); Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 635, 65 S.Ct. 821
(1945); MooRE, CoMMENTARY ON BE U.S. JurnciAL CoDE 173, 189 (1949).
12 See note 8 supra.
'3 In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., note 5 supra, the Court repudiated the doc-
trine that a statute which relinquishes governmental immunity to suit should be strictly
construed in favor of the government.
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the court in the principal case made a decisive determination that section
1402(b) was only a venue provision of the ordinary variety, the remainder of
its reasoning would have been convincing.
Robert B. Olsen, S.Ed.
